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Abstract
Oil and natural gas are highly valuable natural resources, but many countries with large untapped reserves suffer from poor
economic and social-welfare performance. This conundrum is known as the resource curse. The resource curse is a result of
poor governance and wealth distribution structures that allow the elite to monopolize resources for self-gain. When rival
social groups compete for natural resources, civil unrest soon follows. While conceptually easy to follow, there have been
few formal attempts to study this phenomenon. Thus, we develop a mathematical model that captures the basic elements
and dynamics of this dilemma. We show that when resources are monopolized by the elite, increased exportation leads to
decreased domestic production. This is due to under-provision of the resource-embedded energy and industrial
infrastructure. Decreased domestic production then lowers the marginal return on productive activities, and insurgency
emerges. The resultant conflict further displaces human, built, and natural capital. It forces the economy into a vicious
downward spiral. Our numerical results highlight the importance of governance reform and productivity growth in reducing
oil-and-gas-related conflicts, and thus identify potential points of intervention to break the downward spiral.
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Introduction
Oil and gas are common, high-value commodities in the world
market. They are also essential commodities for economic growth
and development. Prices for oil and gas have increased dramat-
ically over the last few decades and are expected to continue to do
so. Industrial processes, such as electricity generation, machine
operation, and petroleum chemical production, require oil and
gas. Therefore, areas with abundant oil and gas reserves should be
prosperous; however, economists have shown that oil-and-gas-rich
countries usually suffer from poor economic performance. The few
exceptions include Australia, Canada, and Norway, which are all
countries with a democratic regime and a workable tax system that
redistributes profits from mining to the rest of the economy and
that sustains peaceful development. This economic phenomenon is
referred to as the resource curse [1,2]. Moreover, energy consump-
tion per capita is often far below the world average in oil-and-gas-
rich countries, although these exports constitute most of the
countries economies (see Figure 1). This is further referred to as
the poverty in the midst of plenty.
Research on this resource development puzzle tends to focus on
oil-and-gas-related civil conflict. The high value and high utility of
oil and gas make them points of contest among different social
groups. In a weak government, greedy elite may appropriate
national patrimony to advance their personal fortunes, while
frustrated civilians may use violence to gain control over oil and
gas resources. In turn, the elite resort to outright repression to keep
the civilians in check. The subsequent escalation of the attack-and-
defence cycle displaces human, built, and natural capital [3–5]. It
also generates political instability, which depresses investment and
impedes economic growth [6–8]. Therefore, despite years of oil
and gas extraction, a resource-rich country in civil conflict remains
underdeveloped with an economy that is dangerously reliant on oil
and gas exports [9–12]. This instability intensifies political
competition for control over oil and gas reserves and gives rise
to a loop of causalities between resource dependence and conflict
[13].
Political economy models generally consider conflicts to be
equilibrium behaviors of different interest groups. These models
commonly assume that the opportunity costs of attack and
defence, or equivalently the productive returns on resources and
labor, are exogenously given [3,14–16]. However, these conflict
models are insufficient to address the resource curse. It is plausible
that a resource-abundant country in conflict is worse off than it is
in the absence of conflict [17]. Nevertheless, it is implausible that a
country is worse off than it would be without its natural resources,
simply because it could neglect its resources and thereby escape
from the curse. Therefore, particular attention must be given to
the underlying institutions that drive the economy into self-
destruction, such as social fractionalization [18]. Furthermore,
reduced-form regressions based on these models may be subject to
the problem of endogeneity, because of the possible causality loop
between oil dependence and conflict. Subsequently, these regres-
sions produce biased estimators, unless a natural experiment is
available with relevant content, such as the discovery of an oil field
and the subsequent civil conflict. This poses a challenge for
empirical studies of the mechanisms that underlie the resource
curse and for the formation of related policies.
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This paper offers a supplementary perspective to the current
understanding of the resource curse by using the context of oil, gas,
and conflict. It relates poor economic performance to the existence
of social fractionalization (elite and civilian), market frictions
(monopolistic resource pricing), and resource-related conflict
(economic disturbance). When oil and gas are monopolized by
the elite, they are often exported rather than sold domestically to
support local production. Increased exportation lowers the
marginal return to productive activity, and consequently, civil
insurgency emerges. The resultant conflict further displaces
resources and labor and thus draws the economy into a vicious
circle. In the absence of a natural experiment, this research
provides a potential alternative structure for econometric identi-
fication of the mechanism that drives the resource curse.
Additionally, it offers guidance to international organizations on
the formation of policies for conflict resolution and poverty
reduction.
Analysis
Background
We consider a two-period game that is set up in a small, open
economy. The economy has two sectors: extraction and produc-
tion. The game lasts for two periods t[f1,2g. Let d be a measure
of the population. At the beginning of period 1, there are two
players: an elite E of d-measure 1, who appropriates oil and gas
(the resources), and a civilian C of d-measure N1, who has labor
force. Resources can be either exported or sold domestically, while
labor activity can be either productive or insurgent. The elites
represent less than 20% of the total population (1zN1), as shown
in Assumption 1
Assumption 1.
N1§4
Remark 1. This parametric assumption, the so-called 80–20
rule, is consistent with the World Bank statistics that the richest
20% hold close to 50% of the national income in most developing
countries (Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.DST.
05TH.20/countries).
The political regime is autocratic, and the elites rule the
government. Revolution is broadly defined as any insurgent action
or threat against the established political system. We do not
Figure 1. World’s Proven Oil and Gas Reserves, and Earth’s City Lights. Background image courtesy of NASA and data courtesy of CIA-The
World Factbook.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g001
Figure 2. Civilan’s Labor Supply at Various Price Levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g002
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distinguish rebellion, which is the attempt to revolt, from
revolution, which is a successful rebellion. Accordingly, repression
is defined as any counter-insurgency efforts of the elites.
Extraction and Production
Oil and gas are ‘‘point resources’’ that are fixed in location and
thus require sophisticated infrastructures to access, control, and
transport. Only the elite can put together the necessary technology
for exploration, production, and distribution, with the help of
multinational oil and gas companies. The behavior of the
multinationals are not modelled in the scope of this paper.
According to latest Global Trade Analysis Project database
statistics [19], labor in oil and gas extraction constitutes less than
2% of the total labor inputs, or less than 10% of the total inputs
into oil and gas extraction in most of the developing world. For
simplicity, it is assumed that resource extraction does not require
labor input.
As is pre-contracted with the multinationals, in each period, the
elite extracts one unit of resources and exports 1{sst[½0,1 of
resources at price pv?, which is exogenously given and constant.
The remaining sst[½0,1 is sold domestically at price Pt, which is
determined by a monopolistic mechanism to be discussed shortly.
In total, the elite receives the period resource windfall of
WE sst ,Nt;Pt
 
:~sstPtz(1{s
s
t)p ð1Þ
On the other hand, in each period, the civilian is endowed with
one unit of time. The civilian purchases sdt unit of resources from
the elite in the form of energy and industrial infrastructure and
supplies ‘t unit of labor to produce
F ‘t,s
d
t ;Nt
 
:~Z sdt
 a
Nt‘tð Þ1{a
where Nt is the size of civilian population in period t, Z is the total
factor productivity, and a[(0,1) is the output elasticity of resources.
Altogether, the civilian has the period net income of
IC ‘t,s
d
t ;Nt,Pt
 
:~Z sdt
 a
Nt‘tð Þ1{a{sdt Pt ð2Þ
Resource Market Equilibrium
To ensure that the economy has a comparative advantage in
exporting, the following condition is assumed:
Assumption 2.
P :~ZaN1{a1 vp
Remark 2. The following Equation (3) classifies that P is the
marginal return on resources when domestic production is at full
capacity. If the world price is below P, then all resources are
consumed domestically.
Figure 3. Elite’s Counter-Insurgency Expenditure at Various
Price Levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g003
Figure 5. Civilan’s Total Payoff at Various Price Levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g005
Figure 4. Social Welfare at Various Price Levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g004
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Given a domestic resource price of Pt, the civilians optimal
choice is to equalize marginal product and cost of resources as
Pt~aZ stð Þa{1 Nt‘tð Þ1{a ð3Þ
Here, we have used the market clearing condition
sst~s
d
t:st
The elite moves simultaneously with the civilian, and can exert
monopoly power only to maximize current time profit but not to
maximize total survival time profits. Therefore, it is the elites
optimal choice to equalize the marginal profits of export and
domestic sales, as follows:
p~a2Zsa{1t Nt‘tð Þ1{a ð4Þ
Altogether, the resource market equilibrium is
st~
p
a2Z
  1
a{1
Nt‘t ð5Þ
Pt~
p
a
ð6Þ
Remark 3. Assumption 2 ensures that the equality (5) is
attainable.
By substitution, the elites period windfall is:
WE ‘t;Ntð Þ~Z(a{a2) p
a2Z
  a
a{1
Nt‘tzp
and the civilians net income is
IC ‘t;Ntð Þ~Z(1{a) p
a2Z
  a
a{1
Nt‘t
We can now concentrate on the political dynamics between the
elite and the civilian.
Revolution and Repression
At the beginning of period 1, the political statuses of the elites
and the civilians are exogenously given. Over the course of the
period, civilians can stage a rebellion using their non-productive
time 1{‘1. In response, the elites can defend themselves by
directing d1[½0,1 of the resource windfall to the counter-
insurgency expenditure, such as mobilizing military forces, bribing
coup leaders, and seeking external intervention. The probability
that the elites retain power in period is assumed to be determined
Figure 6. Climate Change and Incidence of Conflict.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g006
Figure 7. Resource Dependence and Incidence of Conflict.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g007
Figure 8. Domestic Resource Price at Various Price Levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g008
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by the function h, such that
h(d1,‘1) :~
‘1mzd
c
1
mzdc1
~1{
m
mzdc1
Nt(1{‘t)
Nt
ð7Þ
Here, c[(0,1 and m[(0,z?) are parameters that represent the
elites counter-insurgency effectiveness, which captures possible
foreign military intervention. Since the early nineteenth century,
Britain has played a key role in securing peace and prosperity in
the Persian Gulf region. Following World War II, Britain scaled
back its military presence around the world because of its
economic problems. When Britain announced plans to withdraw
troops from the Gulf region, the sheiks of the region asked the
British to stay to ensure stability. For more information about oil-
related and gas-related foreign intervention, see [20]. The
restriction c[(0,1 ensures that h is concave in d1. Given
d1[½0,1, the rightmost term of Equation (7) is decreasing in c.
The spillovers of conflict into neighboring regions and the
consequential countermeasures such as military intervention,
economic sanctions and humanitarian aid are not explicitly
considered in this paper.
The elites contest success function, i.e., Equation (7), is a fusion
of two streams in the literature. The first presentation is similar to
‘‘gun choice,’’ as seen in [17]. The second presentation has the
essence of probabilistic voting
Nt(1{‘t)
Nt
, which follows [21].
Because probabilistic voting eliminates the impact of the size of
civilian population on political change, we make it comparable by
assuming that only d1, the elites counter-insurgency expenditure as
a proportion of total resource windfall, plays a role in h.
Remark 4. By the law of large numbers, the situation in
which the civilian revolts with some effort is equivalent to the real-
world situation, in which some organized civilians fight against the
elites with full effort headed by a coup leader, while the remaining
civilians continue to work with full effort. Modeling collective
action of civilians is complex [22] and is beyond the scope of this
paper.
The following properties of h are in order. First, the elite retains
power when there is no revolution:
h d1,1ð Þ~1, Vd1
Second, the marginal regime-stabilization effect of the elites
counter-insurgency efforts is positive and diminishing:
h’1 d1,‘1ð Þw0, h’’1 d1,‘1ð Þv0 and h’1 0,‘1ð Þ~? if ‘1=1
h’1 d,‘1ð Þ~0, Vd1 if ‘1~1
Third, the marginal regime-stabilization effect of the civilians
productive commitment is positive and constant:
0vh’2 d1,‘1ð Þƒ1 and h’’2 d1,‘1ð Þ~0
Figure 9. Domestic Resource Sales at Various Price Levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g009
Figure 10. Civilian’s Labor Supply under Alternative Timing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g010
Figure 11. Elite’s Counter-Insurgency Expenditure under
Alternative Timing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g011
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Last, the elites counter-insurgency efforts and the civilians
productive commitment are substitutes:
h’’12 d1,‘1ð Þv0 if ‘1=1
Aftermath of Insurgency
Insurgency is rewarding but risky. If the insurgency is successful,
then the elite dies, and some ‘‘lucky’’ civilian of d-measure 1
becomes the new elite. This leads to an expected loss of civilian
population:
N2~N1{1zh d1,‘1ð Þ ð8Þ
This indirectly affects productivity in period 2, and can be
considered as the expected lethality of revolution. Additionally,
violence always causes the civilian to forgo work earnings, no
matter who wins.
Remark 5. Our model does not penalize the civilian if a
rebellion is unsuccessful. Modeling this type of penalty requires a
discrete function to capture the fact that the elite is penalized only
if he or she revolts with an infinitely small effort and still fails, but
not if he or she does not revolt. This treatment reduces the
continuity and interior differentiability of the model, which are
crucial to proving existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
The expected loss of population already captures the dynamic
trade-off of the civilian in relation to insurgency. Thus, we abstract
the violence penalty to offer a theoretical model with a unique
equilibrium solution that is econometrically identifiable.
Strategic Interactions
Both the elite and the civilian have perfect information and
move simultaneously in each period. Knowing the probabilistic
regime switching and given the civilians labor supply f‘tgt[f1,2g,
the elite chooses defence budget fdtgt[f1,2g to obtain
TE fdt,‘t;Ntgt[f1,2g
 
:~RE1 (d1,‘1;N1)
zbh1(d1,‘1)R
E
2 (d2,‘2;N2)
ð9Þ
where b is the discount factor, and
REt dt,‘t;Ntð Þ~(1{dt)(Z(a{a2)
p
a2Z
  a
a{1
Nt‘tzp), t[f1,2gð10Þ
is the elites period payoff net of counter-insurgency expenditures.
On the other hand, also knowing the probabilistic regime
switching and given the elites defence budget fdtgt[f1,2g, the
civilian chooses labor supply f‘tgt[f1,2g to obtain
Figure 12. Elite’s Total Payoff under Alternative Timing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g012
Figure 13. Domestic Resource Sales under Alternative Timing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g013
Figure 14. Social Welfare under Alternative Timing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066706.g014
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TC fdt,‘t,Ntgt[f1,2g
 
~
X2
t~1
bt{1RCt (dt,‘t;Nt)
zb 1{h(d1,‘1)ð ÞRE2 (d2,‘2;N2)
ð11Þ
where
RCt dt,‘t,Ntð Þ :~IC(‘t,Nt)~Z(1{a)
p
a2Z
  a
a{1
Nt‘t, t[f1,2g ð12Þ
is the civilian’s period payoff.
Remark 6. Although it is more realistic to assume that both
the elite and the civilian are risk-averse, this greatly complicates
the math. However, letting the elite and the civilian be risk-neutral
and assigning linear utilities to their period payoffs does not
change the fundamental results of the model. In fact, it gives rise to
an equilibrium with no labor supply and thus no domestic
production, which better approximates a full-scale civil war.
Equilibria of Resource-Related Conflict
Let G~SfE,Cg,fNtgt[f1,2g,fTE ,TCg,xT be the two-stage
game, as defined in the previous section, where
x~fa,b,c,l,m,pg is the list of all model parameters. For the game
G, the following solution concept is adopted:
Definition 1. A sub-game perfect equilibrium is a pure-
strategy profile Nt.(dt ,‘

t ) such that
N fdt gt[f1,2g maximizes TE , given f‘t gt[f1,2g,
N f‘t gt[f1,2g maximizes TC , given fdt gt[f1,2g,
N for any N2 that is predetermined, d2 maximizes RE2 , given ‘2,
N for any N2 that is predetermined, ‘2 maximizes RC2 , given d2.
Our first result of this paper now follows:
Theorem 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
1. Let x and N1 be fixed. There exists a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium
to the game G, and it can be solved by backward induction.
2. Let x and N1 be fixed. The solution to the period-2 sub-game is d

2~0
and ‘2~1, and the solution to the period-1 sub-game must be of one of the two
forms below:
N peace with d1~0 and ‘1~1, or
N conflict with d1[(0,1 and ‘1[½0,1).
When ‘1~0, we call the equilibrium civil war.
3. Let other parameters in x and N1 be fixed. There exists a p[(P,?) such
that ‘1~0, Vpwp. That is, the increase of world resource price will
eventually lead to a civil war.
Proof. See Appendix S1.
Remark 7. The equilibrium of repression and revolution
discussed above offers a candidate mechanism for the resource-
related conflict. As the elites take a large share of the domestic
product, the civilians engage in insurgent activities to uplift their
political status and raise the expected economic payoffs. The elites
rely on resource windfall from exports and resort to outright
repression, rather than economic reforms, to keep the civilians in
check and to resolve their discontent. Interested readers can refer
to, e.g., [23], for discussions on the effect of resource abundance
on the political leaders behavior and political-regime determina-
tion. The subsequent escalation of attack and defence displaces
labor and destabilizes the domestic environment, which adversely
affects production. Consequently, resource exports emerge as the
main source of national income, and power struggles over the
control of resources prevail. Additionally, the incidence of social
conflict parallels the economys increased dependence on resource
exports, since higher world resource prices push up the cost of
domestic production and intensify the civilians discontent. Because
the equilibrium exists and is unique, it is possible to test it against
real data. Indeed, our analytical result on the monotonicity of
revolution (part 3 of the theorem) is consistent with the empirical
finding of Besley and Persson [24,25] that the oil export price is
positively correlated with the incidence of civil war and that civil
war is more prevalent among non-democratic oil producers.
Consequences of Resource-Related Conflict
In this section, we investigate the (expected) Pareto inferiority of
the equilibrium outcome of our model (RV henceforth) as
compared to two alternative models. The first-best alternative
(SP henceforth) has a social planner who solves the following
program:
max
f‘t,stgt[f1,2g
X2
t~1
bt{1 WE(‘t,st,N1)zI
C(‘t,st,N1)
 ( )
givenN1ð13Þ
In the second-best alternative (MN henceforth), the elite is an
unchallengeable monarch:
h(d1,‘1):1, Vd1,‘1
Clearly, the existence of social fractionalization and market
monopoly in model MN distinguishes it from SP, while the
existence of conflict in RV distinguishes it from MN.
We also compare our model to a resource-deficient economy
(IM henceforth), in which there is no social fractionalization and
all resources are imported. In the absence of monopoly, the
representative civilian solves the following program:
max
f‘t,stgt[f1,2g
X2
t~1
bt{1IC(‘t,st,N1)
( )
givenN1 ð14Þ
This IM economy has a comparative disadvantage in resources
but an advantage in market institutions.
Let M~fRV ,SP,MN,IMg be the collection of models as
discussed above. Accordingly, for t[f1,2g,r[M, let fdt,r,‘t,r,st,rg
denote the equilibrium solutions, fFt,rg denote the equilibrium
domestic production, and fTCr ,TEr ,Wrg denote the equilibrium
payoffs of the civilian, the elite, and the economy as a whole.
When appropriate, we let fTCr (p)g denote the civilians equilib-
rium payoff, given the world resource price p. The following
results are in order:
Theorem 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and let x be fixed.
1. The existence of social fractionalization, market monopoly, and civil conflict
leads to the under-provision of labor and resources and thus depresses domestic
production:
Oil, Gas, and Conflict
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‘t,RVƒ‘

t,MN~‘

t,SP~‘

t,IM
st,RVƒs

t,MNvs

t,SP~s

t,IM
Ft,RVƒFt,MNvFt,SP~Ft,IM
As a result, resources and labor are displaced from the social optimum:
WRVƒWMNvWSP
The civilian is better off as a result of insurgency:
TCRV§T
C
MN
Being challenged, however, the elite is worse off:
TERVƒT
E
MN
All inequalities above are strict when conflict prevails, that is, ‘t,RVv1.
2. Let the conflict technology, i.e, m,c, be constant. If either Z, a or b is
sufficiently small, then there exists a p[(P,?) , such that
TCRV (p)vT
C
IM (p), Vp[(P
,p 
In other words, civilians in a resource-abundant economy can be poorer than
their counterparts in a resource-deficient economy with better market
institutions.
Proof. See Appendix S1.
Remark 8. The theorem above provides a potential expla-
nation for the resource curse. First, domestic production and total
social welfare are lower in an economy with resources that are
appropriated by the elite rather than in an economy with resources
that are allocated by a benevolent social planner. This captures the
primary welfare loss, which is caused by market frictions and
monopoly. Second, over the course of conflict, resources and labor
are displaced from socially profitable activities. This captures the
secondary welfare loss, which is caused by attack and defence. For
these two reasons, resource-abundant countries may fail to become
wealthy. Moreover, if climate conditions are unfavorable (i.e., Z
being small), if domestic production is labor-intensive (i.e., a being
small), or if the economy is trapped in a prolonged war (i.e., b
being small), then resource abundance is a curse. This is because
the opportunity cost of conflict, as measured by the foregone
growth potential, can be immense. Only a minority of civilians will
become the new elite and reap the benefits, thus leaving the
majority to handle the aftermath of conflict. In contrast, for a
resource-deficient economy, domestic-oriented industrialization is
a better choice for development. Indeed, according to the recent
finding of Caselli and Tesei, resource-deficient countries are more
likely to be democratic (Source: http://www.nber.org/papers/
w17601). Thus, resource-rich countries may eventually be poorer
than resource-poor countries.
Results and Discussion
In this section, we report the numerical results of our
mathematical model. We begin by calibrating the baseline to
replicate stylized facts of the resource curse and civil conflict. We
then conduct sensitivity analyses with parameters in the produc-
tion function that are related to climate condition and resource
dependence. We also investigate the policy implications of
resource subsidy and the strategic aspect of domestic-resource
sales.
Baseline
For the baseline exercise, we assume N1~4, which means that
civilians constitute 80% and elites constitute 20% of the total
population. We set total factor productivity Z in the production
function F equal to 1. Having a developing country in mind, we
set the parameter a equal to 0:2, which is much lower than what is
commonly used in the literature. The discount factor b, is set to
0:67, which implies a conflict length of roughly 10 years, assuming
an annual interest rate of 4%. The parameter m in the regime-
switching function h is set to 0:33, which implies that the elite is
three times more likely to win when both the elite and the civilian
battle at full strength. According to a recent research of Collier and
Hoeffler, only 82 out of 336 rebellions in Africa from 1960 to 2001
were successful (Source: http://users.ox.ac.uk/ econpco/re-
search/pdfs/MilitarySpendingandRisksCoups.pdf). The other pa-
rameter c is set to 0:9, which implies that doubling d1, the elites
counter-insurgency expenditure as a share of total resource
windfall, roughly doubles the chance of retaining power when d1
is within 10%, but chances are lower when it is greater than.
The numerical results confirm our model prediction (Figures 2
to 5). Oil and gas prices are positively correlated to the incidence
of conflict. Although conflict worsens social welfare, the civilian is
in fact better off. An export boom (roughly a 200% price wedge)
can relatively easily provoke resource-related civil conflict.
However, a substantially higher world price (roughly a 600%
price wedge) is required to compensate for the lost growth
potential and to make civilians in a resource-abundant economy as
successful as their resource-deficient counterparts, who have a
more supportive market environment. This shows how easy it is to
turn a resource fortune into a curse and how difficult it is to turn a
curse into a fortune. In addition, the comparison across the four
models, namely, RV , SP,MN and IM, highlights the importance
of governance reform in oil-and-gas-related conflict resolution and
poverty reduction.
Climate Change and the Incidence of Conflict
In the context of domestic agricultural production, total factor
productivity Z in the production function F can be understood as
climate conditions, such as rainfall variation. Our model can be
applied to recent studies of global climate and civil conflict [26–
28]. Intuitively, adverse climate conditions (i.e., Z being small)
lowers the return to legal labor activity, which causes the civilian to
challenge the existing elites and to take over control of resources,
and vice versa. This is confirmed in the simulation (Figure 6)
where we alter the value of Z to 0:5 and 1:5, respectively. Other
parameters stay the same as in the baseline. Our simulation also
highlights the importance of productivity growth in oil-and-gas-
related conflict resolution.
Resource Dependence and the Incidence of Conflict
By Euler’s Theorem (see, e.g., [29]), the output elasticity of
resources a in the production function F is also a measure of the
economys dependence on resources. In the context of social
Oil, Gas, and Conflict
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fractionalization and monopolistic pricing, as a increases, the share
of domestic output that is taken by the resource-owning elite
increases, and thus the elite discontent increases. This is confirmed
in the simulation (Figure 7) when we alter the value of a to 0:1 and
0:3, respectively. Other parameters stay the same as in the
baseline. Intuitively, this suggests that, in an economy with less
demand for oil and gas, high export prices are less likely to trigger
conflict.
Resource Subsidy
Our model predicts that a resource-rich country with weak
governance will have higher prices of oil and gas and lower
consumption in the domestic market. In fact, many oil-and-gas-
rich countries have struggled with sub-par levels of energy
consumption, as previously discussed. However, it is more often
the case that oil-and-gas-rich countries have lower energy prices,
even after accounting for transportation costs (Source: http://
www.mytravelcost.com/petrol-prices/). This is counter-intuitive,
as low resource prices should stimulate consumption.
To reconcile the observed reality, economic intuitions, and our
model prediction, we postulate that domestic resources subside.
We assume, ex post, that a fixed shared of the elites counter-
insurgency fund is appropriated and spent as an ad valorem
resource subsidy. In other words, the subsidies occur and become
known to the civilian only after both ‘1 and d1 are determined.
This redistribution scheme is never optimal, because it is arbitrary,
conspired by the elite, and beyond the civilians strategic
consideration. None of the fundamentals of our model is changed.
Therefore, the same equilibrium would emerge even if domestic
resource consumption were now subsidized. Social conflict may
still linger and disrupt production. As a result, the resource
consumption of a resource-abundant economy can be lower than
that of a resource-deficient economy, despite a lower domestic
price of resources.
On top of the baseline, we assume that 50% of the counter-
insurgency expenditure is directed to subsidize domestic resource
consumption. Figures 8 and 9 show that subsidy is most likely to be
superfluous. By assumption, the domestic price is zero when
resource consumption is (more than) fully subsidized on a per-unit
basis or when there is no demand. As long as the institution of
transfer is not open to the involvement of the civilian, insurgency is
still the default activity and domestic production ceases. Subse-
quently, the subsidization budget is squandered. This simulated
result is a stronger demonstration of the model prediction of trade-
pattern effects of conflict than that of Garfinkel et al. [17]. If
subsidy is an ineffective stimulator, then domestic consumption of
resources remains low. Civil conflict interrupts production, and
thus resources are over-exported.
Strategic Aspect of Resource Sales
Our model assumes that the elite moves simultaneously with the
civilian in each period. Therefore, the elite can exert monopoly
power only to maximize current time profit, rather than to
maximize total survival time profits, because the choice of
domestic resource sales has no effect on regime switching. This
is a reasonable assumption, because many states with an elite class
also have weak governance, and each individual elite controls a
piece of the oil and gas resources. The consequential conflict
between corrupt elites and frustrated civilians leads the economy
into a development trap. The first-best solution is to transform the
fractionalized state into a democratic nation and to streamline elite
and civilian interests, as demonstrated in section with the social-
planner model.
However, as a robustness check, we also consider a scenario in
which the elites collude and form a strategic alliance to tip
resource sales towards the domestic market. This decreases
rebellion risk and maximizes the elitesJ total survival time profit.
In this alternative timing model, with other things being the same
as in the baseline, the elite pre-commits a certain amount of
resources to domestic use before the civilian commits to labor
supply. The elite commits to a level of counter-insurgency
expenditure. An extra step of backward induction is to optimize
the elites strategic choice of resource sales, considering its effects
on the elites later choice of counter-insurgency expenditure and
the civilians simultaneous choice of labor supply. The existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium can be established by an
approach that is similar to that in this paper, in which we use
numerical simulation without rigorous mathematical analysis.
Our simulated results suggest that the economy is more peaceful
in the alternative timing model (Figures 10 to 11). However, the
elite is worse off than in the baseline (Figure 12). In other words, it
is not profitable (from the elites point of view) or credible (from the
elites point of view) for the elite to pre-commit domestic resource
sales. Additionally, domestic resource sales are more volatile
(Figure 13). When the world prices are low, the elite exports no
resources; however, when world prices are sufficiently high, the
elite exports all resources. Consequently, the welfare implication is
mixed (Figure 14).
Conclusions
Resource-abundant countries often show poor economic
growth. This paper proposes a theoretical framework to study
this paradox in the context of oil, gas, and conflict. The model
addresses issues of social fractionalization, market friction, and
civil conflict. It shows that the equilibrium between elite and
civilian individual maximization behaviors can undermine the
peaceful environment that is needed for industrialization and
development. It can also further provoke resource-related conflict.
The model predictions are consistent with observable facts.
The setup of the model is simple, and the parameter
assumptions are non-stringent. Yet, it features a causality loop
between resource dependence, conflict, and poor economic
performance. Since the equilibrium of the model is proven to
exist, and it is unique and eventually monotone, the model
provides a well-defined structure for hypothesis testing and for the
econometric identification of the mechanisms that underlie the
resource curse.
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